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Abstract
In a 2-country and 3-period OLG model with education, we study the impact on
international migration of the two sided characteristics of borders. Individuals must first
“leave” their home country before “entering” the destination country. Indeed, each social
planner chooses the static welfare optimal level of education, consumption, labor and
capital. A unique migration flow is compatible with the market steady-state equilibrium
and the maximizing social welfare solution. Difference in education generates
differences in steady-state capital per capita. Consequently, both price differentials and
incentives for illegal migration exist. Application to real world cases is provided.
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1 Introduction
Australia, Canada, the USA and New Zealand have all been founded by migration. How-
ever, nowadays, they have in common the implementation of migration programs to
determine who is eligible to migrate. In this paper an optimal legal system of migra-
tion represents the optimal migration policy based on economic criteria a given country
implements. There are various legal systems of migration: those which are explicit and
those which are implicit. It is well understood that most countries do not allow every
immigrant to enter their country (by explicit selection devices), but is not well understood
that many country refrain emigrants from leaving their country (by implicit stay-home
incentives), even if borders are legally open.
The objective of the paper is to provide a rationale to these optimal legal systems of
international migration. Since countries adopt various migration criteria, among which
education is an important one for the social planner, this paper proposes a 3-period over-
lapping generations model in which individuals train when they are young and work when
they are adults. Finally, when old, they optimally choose their retirement date. Such a
model allows conclusions on both growth and welfare prior to migration (in autarky) and
post-migration (when borders are open on their two sides).
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The motivation for such a framework directly comes from empirical facts. Australia
and Canada have organized an explicit optimal legal system of migration based on points
to be accumulated by any would-be migrant. If they succeed in overpassing the threshold,
would-be migrants are allowed to settle. A key feature of these legal systems of migration
is that the threshold figure is not permanent. It is optimally and legally set by governments
given the specific economic needs of the country.
Many developing countries (especially in Africa) have chosen an implicit legal system
of migration. For instance they prefer to invite foreign professors to teach in the country
rather than to let students migrate to be educated abroad. Some others have chosen
to finance home PhD programs with a very high research allowance for students, or some
others charge very low interest rates on education loans. The main reason for such incen-
tives to stay home is to refrain as much as possible student migration. It costs less to pay
foreign professors to teach (and students to learn) than to loose human capital in the
future. Indeed, if a student is successful on the foreign labor market, he never return-
migrates. In this paper, we describe the two-sided border by the fact that individuals must
first “leave” their home country before “entering” the destination country.
The literature can broadly be classified between empirical and theoretical studies.
Withers (1987), for example, empirically shows that the skill level of migrants arriving in
Australia has tended to increase in the postwar period at a more rapid rate than that of the
resident population as a whole. In other words, the effectiveness of the points system in
raising the mean skill level of immigrants depends on the existence of a large demand for
visas to enter Australia. A study of the worldwide market for skilled immigrants by Cobb-
Clark and Connolly (1997) suggests that the skills of those wanting to enter Australia are
influenced by a range of factors, some of which are internal to Australia (e.g., economic
conditions), while others are external (e.g., immigration policies of other countries). These
factors are likely to have more impact on immigrant quality than the points system.
The points system used in a number of the components of the immigration program in
Australia offers amechanism of selecting immigrants whowill adjust rapidly to the circum-
stances of the Australian labor market and who will bring benefits to Australia. Variations
in immigrant quality in Australia are likely to be affected more by conditions in the world-
wide market for skilled immigrants than by the Australian points system. Understanding
the worldwidemarket for skilled immigrants and determining the net benefits to Australia
of different types of immigrants are important issues for consideration.
Theoretical literature concentrates on endogenous quotas of migrants through a voting
systemwhich allows governments to implement immigration policies. Epstein andNitzan
(2005) analyze the endogenous determination of a migration quota, viewing it as an
outcome of a two-stage political struggle between two interest groups: those in favor
and those against the proposed migration quota. Theoretical effects of the government
policy depend on whether there is lobbying between those natives who agree and those
who disagree with the proposal of a quota of migrants. Mayrs (2010) derives a general
equilibrium model with overlapping generations where natives require a compensat-
ing wage differential for working in one sector rather than in another. Price and wage
effects of immigration are analyzed on natives: the young, working in one of two sec-
tors, and the old. The outcome of a majority voting on immigration is determined
by a given sector as well as the social optimum. The main findings are: i) the old
determine any majority voting outcome of non-zero immigration into both sectors;
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ii) socially optimal immigration is smaller than or equal to the majority voting outcome;
and iii) immigration is not necessarily a substitute for native mobility across sectors.
Candau (2011) analyzes how trade liberalization and immigration can potentially affect
the welfare of native skilled and unskilled workers and how this expected impact plays on
immigration policy. The novelty resides in the attempt to set up endogenous immigration
restrictions by integrating swing voters in a model of geographical economics with two
kinds of immobile workers (skilled and unskilled). It is shown that trade liberalization can
lead the winner candidate to increase the quota on immigration.
Mayr (2012) determines occupation-specific immigration quotas in a political econ-
omy framework with endogenous prices and compares them to the social optimum. It
shows that positive quotas for specific occupations can be the political outcome, even
when total welfare effects of immigration are negative. Two of the main findings are that
the (unique) voting outcome on immigration quotas is i) positive if workers are immo-
bile across occupations and ii) negative (positive) for occupations where the native labor
supply is sufficiently large (small), if workers are mobile across occupations.
Contrary to the brain drain literature, which states that high skilled immigrants benefit
the destination country since they generate higher earning profiles, this paper suggests
that a legal system of migration that refrains permanent migrations in order to educate
young individuals in their home country benefits the welfare of the local country. Our
model departs from the literature relative to endogenous quotas. Indeed, we propose an
alternative way to obtain the optimal flow of migrants a country is willing to accept. Each
social planner chooses the number of migrants that maximizes the welfare of his own
country.
Since some countries adopt implicit legal systems of migration to avoid brain waste,
we choose to build a model where only young individuals are allowed to permanently
migrate. The reason is that sending countries loose their human capital throughout the
migrant’s life-cycle, as mentioned above. Subsection 8.4 discusses the possibility of return
migrations. For now, immigrants will obtain a high education degree in the destination
country and get the return to education in this country. The post-migration steady-state
equilibrium is a function of the flow of migrants, which is an instrument for the domestic
migration policy. Since countries differ with respect to their return to education, incen-
tives for migration exist. The way migration ceases is not a pure market mechanism but
the result of the social planner’s decision. The social planner chooses the level of migrants
that leads his country to the post-migration static welfare optimum. Due to differences
in the return to education, social planners choose different migration flows. Closing bor-
ders also means preventing market equalization of prices in the long run, contrary to
Galor (1986).
Most of the time, the two-sided nature of border crossing is not theoretically analyzed,
but empirically, legal migration systems take into account this double reality. In that case,
even if countries have the same way of selecting migrants, they do not select the same
level of migration flow. The emergence of the asymmetry of borders across countries is
due to differences in the return to education. When one of the two countries elicits a
higher return to education than the other, the flow of migrants optimally chosen by this
country is not equal to the one chosen by the other country. In the case where one of the
two countries wants to send more migrants than the other one is ready to accept,
incentives for illegal migration exist in post-migration equilibrium.
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Section 2 presents the model, Section 3 the temporary equilibrium of the economy in
autarky, and Section 4 the autarkic perfect-foresight intertemporal equilibrium. Section 5
is devoted to international migration. Section 6 makes the link between theory and
applications. Section 7 presents the explicit real optimal legal system of Canada and
Australia. Possible extensions of the model are presented in Section 8 prior to Section 9,
which concludes.
2 Themodel
Consider a perfectly competitive international world with no uncertainty, with two coun-
tries, i = 1, 2, where economic activity in each country is operated over infinite discrete
time, such that t = 0, 1, 2, . . . ,∞. In every period, a new generation of individuals Nit is
born and is supposed to be constant over time. Consequently, in autarkyNit+1 = Nit = Ni,
where Ni = 1 > 0 for simplicity1. In each country, a single tradable good is produced
using three factors of production: the capital, the adult efficient labor, and the old effi-
cient labor. Capital depreciates fully after one period. Individuals and firms make rational
decisions under perfect foresights.
2.1 The Individual
Individuals are identical within as well as across generations. Individuals born in country
i = 1, 2 live three periods, each of them being normalized to unity. In the first period
when young, they borrow Eit−1 on their future savings Sit when they are an adult in order
to train at the total cost aeit−1, where a is the price of one unit of education eit−1 in country
i. Education is an individual’s choice. In the second period, adult supply it subunits of




)εi , where 0 < εi < 1 is the country specific return to education. They consume
cit , and the rest Sit = sit + RitEit−1 is saved, where Rit = 1 + rit is the given competitive
factor of interest, and rit is the competitive interest rate in country i during period t. The
total saving Sit is devoted to sit for the second period, and Ritaeit−1 is used for reimbursing
the first period training. In the third period when old, individuals consume dit+1. This
consumption is financed through the return on the second period savings Rit+1sit and their
third period labor supply. Old labor supply is paid at the given competitive wage pit+1
during θ it+1 subunits of time, where Rit+1 and pit+1 are perfectly anticipated. Note that
the third period consumption is a function of the level of education via the total savings
Sit . Rational individuals maximize their log-linear utility function and solve the following
program where β is the time preference, and γ is the preference for leisure
max
cit ,eit−1,it ,dit+1,θ it+1
log cit + γ log
(
1 − it








dit+1 = Rit+1sit + pit+1θ it+1.
(1)
2.2 The firm
In each country i = 1, 2, production occurs within a period according to a constant
return to scale production technology, which is stationary over time. The outputQit of the
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single good is produced by a representative competitive firm at time t with three factors
of production, capital Kit , young efficient labor Nit = it
(
eit−1
)εi , and old efficient labor
it = Nit−1θ it = θ it . The production technology is given by the following Cobb-Douglas






ν , where 0 < σ < 1 is the elasticity
of young efficient labor, and 0 < ν < 1 is the elasticity of old efficient labor. The rational
representative competitive firm maximizes its profit
max
Kit ,it ,θ it










)εi − pitθ it − RitKit . (2)
We now turn to the study of the temporary equilibrium, which is the solution of the two
previous problems, the one of the individual and the one of the firm.
3 Temporary equilibrium of the economy in autarky
The objective of this section is to determine the temporary equilibrium of the economy
in autarky. For doing this, let us recall the definition.
Definition 1. In country i, the temporary equilibrium of period t is a competitive equi-
librium given perfect anticpations on prices, Rit+1 and pit+1, and given past variables, sit−1
and Iit−1 = Nit−1sit−1, or equivalently Kt = st−1.
Consider the individual’s problem 1. Solving the first period budget constraint for sit and






)εi − Ritaeit−1 − cit
]
+ pit+1θ it+1. (3)
Replacing (3) into the objective function, individuals solve the following program
max
cit ,eit ,it ,θ it+1
log cit + γ log
(
1 − it









+ βγ log (1 − θ it+1) .



























1 − θ it+1
. (7)
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A rational competitive firm solves problem 2
max
Kit ,it ,θ it










)εi − pitθ it − RitKit .
The first order condition is





νQit = pitθ it . (10)
Lemma 1. In temporary equilibrium, the adult efficient labor supply is constant, and the
old efficient labor supply is also constant. We have it+1 = it = i and θ it+1 = θ it = θ i,
where
i = 1 − σ + β(1 − σ − ν)
(1 + γ (1 − εi))(1 − σ) + β(1 − σ − ν) , (11)
θ i = ν
γ (1 − σ) + ν . (12)
The proof of Lemma 1 is given in Appendix A.
Using (5), (8), and (9), we have
eit−1 =
εiσKit




(1 − σ − ν)a . (13)
Property 1. The level of education is an increasing linear function of capital and of the
returns to education, as well as a decreasing function of the education cost, a.
4 The autarkic perfect-foresight intertemporal equilibrium
The perfect-foresight intertemporal equilibrium with constant population growth is
obtained with the capital dynamics Kit+1 = sit .
Lemma 2. The dynamics of the economy are convergent
Kit+1 =
β(1 − σ − ν)
1 − σ + β(1 − σ − ν)σ
(
1 − εi) iσ [ εiσ





The steady-state equilibrium is unique
Ki =
⎡
⎣β(1 − σ − ν)σ (1 − εi)
1 − σ + β(1 − σ − ν)
[
εiσ











Proof. By Lemma 1, whatever the generation, efficient labor is constant over time so
that the production of the current period t is
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)εi − Ritaeit−1 − cit .
Using the first order condition of the firm (9) and the first order condition of the
individuals ((5) and (32)) (see Appendix A), we have
1 − σ + β(1 − σ − ν)




1 − εi)Qit ,
Kit+1 =
β(1 − σ − ν)
1 − σ + β(1 − σ − ν)σ
(
1 − εi)Qit .
Replacing the production by its expression, we have
Kit+1 =
β(1 − σ − ν)
1 − σ + β(1 − σ − ν)σ
(








)εi , we have
Kit+1 =
β(1 − σ − ν)
1 − σ + β(1 − σ − ν)σ
(
1 − εi) iσ [ εiσKit





Isolating Kit , the dynamics of the economy are convergent
Kit+1 =
β(1 − σ − ν)
1 − σ + β(1 − σ − ν)σ
(
1 − εi) iσ [ εiσ





The steady-state equilibrium is unique
Ki =
⎡
⎣ β(1 − σ − ν)σ (1 − εi)
(1 − σ) + β(1 − σ − ν)
[
εiσ











Note that the steady-state capital per worker is a quasi-concave function of εi. This will
be important for the next section.
5 International migration
Let us now consider that there are two countries, i = 1, 2. Countries are solely charac-
terized by a difference in the return to education in the production function. We assume
that the following inequality ε1 > ε2 holds for the rest of the theoretical analysis. There
are no other differences between countries. In country 2 the productivity of education is
higher than in country 1, since εi ∈ [0, 1].
5.1 Incentives for permanent international migration
Suppose that labor is permitted to migrate internationally. Let us assume that only the
young can permanentlymigrate.Migrants spend their education time, their working time,
as well as their leisure or their retirement time over the three periods in the immigration
country. The borders between countries are supposed to be opened at time t − 1 = 0.
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, international migration is unilat-
eral. Rational individuals born in country i have an incentive for permanent migration in
country j, where i = j.
Proposition 1 shows that permanent migration occurs if the utility of the ratio of the
marginal returns to education of country 1 over country 2 is less than the discounted
utility of the ratio of the production of country 2 over country 12.
Proof. Rational individuals born in country 1 have an incentive for permanent migra-
tion in country 2 if their indirect utility evaluated at the steady-state price system
of country 2 over their life-cycle is higher than their indirect utility evaluated at the
steady-state prices of country 1. The condition is:
log c11 + γ log
(
1 − 11
)+ β log d12 < log c21 + γ log (1 − 21)+ β log d22.
Note that we know from the previous sections that the labor supply is an increasing











We now prove that












Using relation (32) in Appendix A
ci1 =
1 − σ
β(1 − σ − ν)K
i
2,
and using (13), we have
Ki2 =
a(1 − σ − ν)
σεi
ei1,
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As long as ε1e2 > ε2e1, the left hand side is always negative so that the condition is
satisfied, considering that in the right hand side, the ratio of production is greater than
one3.
5.2 Dynamics with permanent international migration
Subsection 5.2 is devoted to the study of the dynamics of capital in country 2 and country
1. Without loss of generality, we consider that incentives for migration are directed from
country 1 to country 2. In this model, only the young are permitted to permanently
migrate from country 1 to country 2. In steady-state equilibrium, period t − 1 = 0, bor-
ders are open. A fraction mi of the young is allowed to migrate. As it will be shown, mi
may be positive or negative depending on the direction of the incentives for international
migration. Consequently, according to the previous Subsection 5.1,m1 < 0 characterizes
the fact that individuals emigrate from country 1, whilem2 > 0 characterizes the fact that
individuals immigrate in country 2.
Since after migration individuals are identical in each country — they train in the home
country if they do not migrate, or they train abroad if they migrate — in a given period
t ≥ 2, the population in country 2 is L2t = 2t +m21t =
(
1 + m2) 2t , while the population
in country 1 is L1t =
(










)1−σ−ν (1 + m2)σ (2t eε2t−1)σ (1 + m2)ν θνt
⇐⇒ Q2t =
(
1 + m2)σ+ν (K2t )1−σ−ν (l2t eε2t−1)σ θνt .




)1−σ−ν (1 − m1)σ (1t eε1t−1)σ (1 − m1)ν θνt
⇐⇒ Q1t =
(
1 − m1)σ+ν (K1t )1−σ−ν (l1t eε1t−1)σ θνt .
Note that there are no indexes on the old efficient labor since whatever the country, old








1−m1)σ+ν (K1t )1−σ−ν (1t eε1t−1)σ θνt −w1t (1−m1) 1t eε1t−1−p1t (1−m1) θ1t −R1t K1t .
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The first order condition for country i = 1, 2 where mi is positive for i = 2 or negative
for i = 1
(1 − σ − ν) Q
i
t




1 + mi , (16)
σ
Qit














Note that the following relations are unchanged compared with autarkic equilibrium,
but now, due to migration flows, the population can no longer be normalized to unity as
was the case in autarky. The dynamics of country 2 and country 1 are
K2t+1 =
(
1 + m2) s2t ,
K1t+1 =
(
1 − m1) s1t .
Consequently, considering that m2 > 0 and m1 < 0, the individual’s first and second










dit+1 = Rit+1 k
i
t+1
1+mi + pit+1θ it+1.
Using exactly the same procedure as in autarky, we obtain the new expressions of the
consumption of the old
dit+1 = (1 − σ)
Qit+1
1 + mi ,
the consumption of the young
cit =
[ 1 − σ
β(1 − σ − ν)
] Kit+1
1 + mi ,
the adult and old labor are unchanged, and finally
eit−1 =
εiσ
(a(1 − σ − ν))
Kit
1 + mi .
Property 2. The old efficient labor supply is independent of the returns to education, εi,
i.e., there is labor market integration of migrants when old.
Using the second period budget constraint, we can easily compute the steady-state
capital per worker in each country.
Kˆ2=
⎡
⎣β(1 − σ − ν)σ (1−εi) (1 + m2)ν+σ(1−εi)
(1 − σ) + β(1 − σ − ν)
[
εiσ














⎣β(1 − σ − ν)σ (1 − εi) (1 − m1)ν+σ(1−εi)
(1 − σ) + β(1 − σ − ν)
[
εiσ
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Since both post-migration economies converge to a market steady-state equilibrium,
we now investigate by which migration policy the social planner can guide the economy
towards a first-best static welfare optimum. In standard overlapping generations models,
this is designated as the Golden Rule, and the government would calculate a tax system
that leads the static capital per capita to maximize total consumption in that static state.
Our problem is not exactly the same for two reasons. The first reason is that there is no
tax system in our economy, and the second reason is that our problem is multidimen-
sional. Since there is no tax system, the government uses the migration rate as a policy
instrument in order to choose the static welfare maximizing level of education, adult and
old labor, consumption, as well as the capital per worker ratio. Consequently, we must
reformulate the social planner’s problem, and this is the objective of the next subsection.
5.3 The static welfare optimumwith permanent international migration
We define the static welfare optimum of the economy and examine how it can be
reached. It is defined as the stationary state that a social planner would select to max-
imize welfare under the feasibility constraint. The welfare criterion a collectivity must
choose in order to rank all possible steady states has usually been described — following
Samuelson (1958) — as the one that maximizes aggregate consumption. In standard
models, this is called the Golden Rule, and the government would calculate the static
capital per capita that achieves this. Our problem is slightly different in the sense that
now the social planner of each country i = 1, 2 maximizes the static welfare, and by
doing this, he chooses the optimal levels of education eiw (where the subscript w cap-
tures the welfare maximizing solution of each variable), adult labor iw and old labor
θ iw, adult and old consumptions ciw and diw, as well as the capital per worker kiw. He
uses the level of migration mi as an instrument to guide the economy toward the static
welfare optimum, taking into account the macroeconomic equilibrium constraint of his
country.
In the integrated world economy, the benevolent social planner in each country i = 1, 2






]+ γ log (1 − iw)+ β log [diw]+ βγ log (1 − θ iw) ,
subject to the macroeconomic equilibrium constraint







In each country i = 1, 2 the first order condition is
(1 − σ − ν)Qiw = Kiw, (21)
σQiw
ciwiw
= γ1 − iw
, (22)
aeiw = εiσQiw, (23)
νQiw
ciwθ i
= βγ1 − θ iw
, (24)
diw = βciw. (25)
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The post migration macroeconomic constraint of the country 2 is as follows
ciw = Qiw − aeiw − diw − Kiw.





= (1 + β)
ν + (1 − εi) σ . (26)
Putting the last expression into (22) and isolating iw gives the optimal adult labor iw in
each country i = 1, 2
iw =
σ(1 + β)
σ(1 + β) + γ [ν + σ (1 − εi)] . (27)
Also, putting (26) into (24) and isolating θ iw gives the optimal old labor in each country





ν + σ (1 − εi)]+ ν(1 + β) . (28)




(1 − σ − ν)a . (29)




⎣(1 − σ − ν)( εiσ










Proposition 2. 1. If the return to education is lower in country 2 than in country 1,
the level of migration the social planner of country 2 implements is less than the
one chosen by the social planner of country 1.
2. There are always incentives for illegal migration from country 1 toward country 2.




















m1 = 1 −
[[












Lemma 3. Since iw, i, θ iw and 1/
[(
1 − εi) θ iν] are increasing functions of the return to
education εi, i = 1, 2, m2 is an increasing convex function of ε2, and m1 is a decreasing
concave function of ε1.
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The proof is given in Appendix B.
Proposition 3. There are incentives for illegal migrations.
Proof. Incentive for migration are directed from country 1 to country 2, if and only if
| m2 |<| m1 |, and in the remaining of the paper, we will assume that this condition
holds. If not, international migration is in the opposite direction.
In what follows, since we study post-migration perfect foresight equilibria, the post-
migration flow is defined m = min {m1,m2}, which is exactly anticipated by each
country.
5.4 Incentive for illegal migration
Each social planner maximizes the utility of his own country; consequently, all education,
consumption, labor, and capital are set at their welfare maximizing levels. When borders




= Kiw is satisfied.
Proposition 4. In post-migration steady-state equilibrium, there are incentives for illegal
migration.
Proof. Let us consider the case were the optimal desired flows of migrants differ across
countries, since ε2 < ε1. In that case and under the unilateral migration condition, the
two migration flows satisfy the following inequality | m1 |≥| m2 |. Consequently,
there are incentives for country 1 to support illegal migration flows in the direction of
country 2.
5.5 The emergence of an optimal price differential between countries
Proposition 5. In post-migration steady-state equilibrium, there is no price equalization
across countries.
Proof. Since the returns to education differ across countries, the optimal migration
policies lead the economies to different steady-state equilibria. Indeed, we have two main
cases
1. The first case is such thatm1 ≥ m2, so that country 2 reaches the optimal level



















2. The second case is such thatm1 < m2, so that country 1 reaches the optimal


















A natural consequence of such differences in steady-state capital is that there is no price
equalization across countries. It always remains a wage differential w1 = w2. p1 = p2, and
there is an interest rate differential across countries, R1 = R2.
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Moreover, rewritting (19) and (20) to obtain the steady–state capital per individual
leads us to conclude that the wage of the sending country increases with migrants, and
the interest rate decreases with migrants. Such a result is compatible with the implicit
legal system of migration, which sets high wages and low interest rates in order to refrain
individuals from migrating.
6 Theory and applications
There are various cases. Hereafter are listed some of the cases that we have selected for
their potential applicability in the real world. Some theoretical comments and empir-
ical facts are provided. All the following figures illustrate each social planer’s optimal





with ε2 < ε1
6.1.1 Theoretical comments
Case 1 is devoted to unilateral migration from country 1 to country 2. It suggests that
the less educated country chooses a much bigger optimal migration flow than the other
country. In this case, the receiving country closes its borders prior the sending country.
Consequently, there exists an incentive for illegal migration from country 1 to country 2.
6.1.2 Empirical fact: TheWall between USA andMexico
Figure 1 is compatible with the wall between USA andMexico4. The most important flow
of migration all over the world during the period 2010-2011 is the one existing between
Mexico and the USA with more than 11 million migrants. The phenomenon is not new
and started during the 80s. A wall between the USA and Mexico was built in 2002. It is
now a 1,300 km long barrier which helps to limit illegal migration from Mexico to the
USA. However, the discontinuity of the wall is the result of strong bargaining between
the governments of the two countries. Indeed, it was the interest of Mexico to let people
migrate since those who migrate provided Mexico with large remittance funds (about
$368 per migrant on average). Moreover, those who return migrate change their social
Figure 1 ElasticityLw/ε2 + Elasticityw/ε2 ≥ L ElasticityL/ε2 .
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status from blue collar to entrepreneur, seeMesnard (2004). The wall has limitedMexican
immigration by about 25%. The US government wanted to stop migration unilaterally,






with ε2 < ε1
6.2.1 Theoretical comments
Case 2 is devoted to unilateral migration from country 1 to country 2, where the less
educated country chooses a much smaller migration flow than the other country. In this
case, the sending country closes its borders prior the other country and does not let its
individuals leave the home country.
6.2.2 Empirical fact: The Senegal migration directed to France
In 2007, the president of Senegal Abdoulaye Wade asked the president of France Nicolas
Sarkosy for the right to choose who is able to migrate from Senegal to France since those
who migrate never return migrate if they are successful in the French labor market. This
caused a deficit of human capital in Senegal, which doesn’t help the country to recover
from the poverty trap in which it has fallen. Even if Senegal invested a great deal in edu-
cation in proportion of its GDP, brain waste is still a major problem. Figure 2 shows that





with ε2 > ε1
6.3.1 Theoretical comments
Suppose that incentives for international migration are reversed, since ε2 > ε1. Figure 3
bellow shows this particular case of unilateral migration from the country with a higher
education level to the country with a lower education level. In this case, the sending coun-
try chooses a smaller optimal migration flow than the receiving country. Such a situation
characterizes a continued demand of immigrants by receiving country 2.
Figure 2 ElasticityLw/ε2 + Elasticityw/ε2 < L ElasticityL/ε2 .
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Figure 3 Unilateral migration where ε2 > ε1.
6.3.2 Empirical fact: Themigration from France to Quebec Province in Canada
In recent years, the Canadian Embassy provides French highly educated students with
strong incentives to migrate to Canada. It seems that there exists a deficit of Canadian
students in France compared with the French students in Canada. The same situation
arises with the USA and England.
6.4 Bilateral migration flows
Bilateral migration flows may also emerge if the unilateral migration condition is not
satisfied, and in that case, we have two possibilities.
6.4.1 Theoretical comments
Figures 4 and 5 show themain cases of bilateral migration between two countries. Accord-
ing to the main assumption of this paper ε1 > ε2, two cases are highlighted. In the first
Figure 4 Bilateral migrations: case 1.
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Figure 5 Bilateral migrations: case 2.
case, the migration flow chosen by country 2 is smaller than the one chosen by country 1.
In the second case, the migration flow chosen by country 2 is bigger than the one chosen
by country 1.
6.5 Empirical fact: The bilateral migration in Europe
In recent years, the Schengen zone authorized individuals to freely migrate from one
country to another. Such a legal system of migration allows for bilateral migration
flows.
7 Optimal legal systems: the Canadian and Australian cases
The focus of this theoretical paper is to provide a rationale for explaining how country-
specific optimal legal systems emerge in order to regulate national migration flows.
Double sided borders have not been theoretically modeled in the literature. It is impor-
tant to have theories taking into account that migration is a two step experience. Crossing
borders means leaving one country (and crossing the “exit” border) prior to entering the
other one (and crossing the “entrance” border). To our knowledge, this paper is the first
to attempt that. The objective of this Section is to put our theoretical results in perspec-
tive with the existing legal system for both Canada and Australia. The relevance of the
previous model is supported by empirical facts. Indeed, prior to migrating to Canada or
to Australia, a migrant must apply for migration and if qualified, he/she can migrate. How
does such a legal system work in practice?
7.1 The Canadian legal system of migration
The Canadian Visa of Immigration is obtained according to a legal system of points, see
Chaabane (2011). The law sets how many points are necessary in order to be eligible to
immigration. This number of points (67 points minimum out of 100 possible in 2014) is
flexible and changes depending on the economic needs of the country (73 points in 2004).
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The government can make migration easier or harder to obtain. The following conditions
are required to be admissible:
1. to have a job offer;
2. to have been a legal resident (Landing resident) for at least one year, or to have
been a foreign student;
3. to be a qualified worker with at least one year of experience in one of the
admissible industries of the country during the last 10 years.
Points are given according to various categories of criteria, which are public knowledge
to any applicant to migration5. Table 1 makes a list of them.
7.2 The Australian legal system of migration
Not only Canada has set up criteria for migration. Australia also does with the General
Skilled Migration Program for individuals who are not sponsored by a “godfather” firm
(or individual) but who are highly qualified in certain jobs for which there are specific
Australian needs. Applicants should be more than 18 years old and not over 50 in order
to accumulate points. They must speak English, have Australian Experience, especially
in the “Australia’s Skilled Occupation List”, or have an Australian Diploma. Various Visas
exists.
1. Onshore Visas are built for individuals who already are living in Australia and who
want to be integrated in the General Skilled Migration Program.
2. The Offshore Visas are made for foreigners who apply for permanent migration to
Australia. This is the most important number of demands, and these Visas are
restricted to qualified workers.
The number of points in 2011 was 65 points out of 100 possible points. Those
who do not reach the threshold enter a specific category called “reserve”. If the
number of points falls, they become immediately eligible prior to any other current
applicant.
7.3 The link between the existing legal system of migration and our results
As Table 1 shows, the Canadian social planner has chosen four criteria relative to
“education” in a wide sense (Education, Language, Experience and Age), as our theo-
retical approach does. Education is an important criterion for the social planner, even
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if it is not necessarily the first criterion for migrants. Most empirical studie under-
lines the migrant motives and not the social planner’s. That is the reason why we build
a 3-period model with education, where the social planner chooses these criteria in
order to select migrants. The main reason for such a selection is that selected migrants
are economically useful for the country. A welfare maximizing criteria is therefore
suitable.
8 Possible extensions of themodel
8.1 The complementarity or substitutability betweenmigrants and natives workers
Ourmodel can also be extended to the case where native workers andmigrant workers are
not perfect substitutes. In order to translate this reality into the model, one can consider
the following production function
Qt (Kt , Lt , et−1, θt) = K1−ν−σt
[
aρt + (1 − a)mρ
] σ
ρ eσt−1θν ,
where ρ is the elasticity of substitution between native and migrant in the production
function. Depending on the various possible values of parameter ρ, such a function
accounts for the possibility of complementarity among native and migrant workers.
8.2 The migration of adults
Suppose two countries are endowed with two different returns to education. Without
loss of generality, one country is more efficient than the other one, referred to here as
country H , i.e., the high return to education country. The other country is the L coun-
try, the low return to education country. Moreover, suppose that only adults are allowed
to migrate. Such an assumption is reasonable since in most countries individuals need to
reach maturity prior to making a decision to migrate. Compared with the current version
of the paper, the difference in the return to education generates differences in the optimal
migration flow of each country. The major difference with this paper is that the H coun-
try accepts everybody migrating from L country. The human capital is more attractive for
an individual from L country since they are better off in the H country rather than stay-
ing home. The social planner of L country closes the borders when the country reaches it
social welfare maximum, while the social welfare function of countryH is always increas-
ing in the migration rate. For that reason, country H never closes its borders and always
accept all migrants.
8.3 The migration cases with population growth
Suppose now that we relax the assumption of a constant population over time in order
to allow it to evolve through time. The law of motion population is Nt+1 = (1 + n)Nt .
The dynamics of the economy is changed as Kt+1 = Ntst . Define the capital per worker
kt = Kt/Nt and use the law of motion of the population growth to have (1 + n)kt+1 = st
to obtain new relations. The equilibrium on the labor market between the demand Lt and
the supply becomes Lt = Ntteεt−1 for adults andt = Nt−1θt for the old. With the law of
motion of the population growth, rewrite the old labor as t = θt1+n . The production per






. The first order condition of the firm is
not changed except that Kt is replaced by kt and θt by θt1+n . Relation (32) becomes ct =
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(1+n)(1−σ)
β(1−σ−ν) kt , relation (13) becomes et−1 = (1+n)εσa(1−σ−ν)kt . Using exactly the same procedure
as before, the steady state equilibrium is
k =
⎡
⎣ β(1 − σ − ν)σ (1 − εi)
(1 + n)1+ν−σε [1 − σ + β(1 − σ − ν)]
[
εiσ











Note that the steady-state is a decreasing function of the rate of population growth n,
whatever its sign, positive or negative. One can also redo the exercise for international
migration and see that the same transformation occurs on the steady-state equilibrium.
8.4 The return migration cases
The return migration case is complex to study. Indeed, the set of all possible patterns of
migration is the following, whereMt means migrating during period t, and Ht live in the
home country during period t.
M∅ ={(M1,M2,M3);(M1,M2,H3); (H1,H2,H3); (H1,M2,M3); (H1,H2,M3); (H1,M2,H3)}
M = {(M1,H2,H3); (M1,H2,M3)}
Only setM is interesting to study. It occurs if and only if incentives for migration hold.
To migrate abroad for education and definitely return migrate (respectively to migrate
abroad for education, return migrate when adult, and migrate again when old) is possi-
ble if the life-cycle indirect utility is higher than the life-cycle indirect utilities of each
other cases, including those in M∅. The major difficulty in studying the convergence
of the dynamics of these two cases is that prices will change over time with migration
flows so that an individual must anticipate all possible movements prior to make the
decision to migrate and return migrate. Nothing indicates that in an overlapping gen-
erations model with three periods, each economy reaches a post-migration steady-state
equilibrium.
9 Conclusion
In a 3-period overlapping generations model with two countries, this paper proposed an
alternative theory of international migration. Indeed, contrary to the traditional litera-
ture on international migration, in this model, international migrations cease due to the
optimal legal system each social planner implements in his country. Differences in social
planners’ decisions are due to differences in the return to education across countries. As a
consequence, each social planer does not chose the same level of migrants in each coun-
try. Thus, an optimal legal system for migration emerges and generates endogenous two
sided borders across countries. Even if each country uses the same method for design-
ing its optimal international migration policy, the optimal level of migration flows varies
across countries. The first natural consequences are the non equalization of prices and
there always remains wage differentials and an interest rate differentials across countries
in the post-migration steady-state equilibrium with optimal legal systems of international
migration. Since migration flows are unilateral, a second natural consequence of the
non-equalization of the steady-states is that incentives for illegal migration always exists.
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Endnotes
1Section 8 relaxes this assumption.
2From Proposition 1, one can view education as a second order individual motive of
migration. In other words, those who are less educated prefer to migrate in order to earn
more.
3We can easily prove that such a situation exists. Indeed, suppose that ε1 > ε2 and
that at the same time ∂K/∂εi < 0, which occurs for high ε2 since the steady-state capital
per worker is a quasi concave function of εi. Using (36), the level of education ei is a
concave function of εi so that we have e2 > e1. Consequently ε1e2 > ε2e1 is satisfied. It
is sufficient to note that the production is also a concave function of εi so that ε2 > ε1 is
equivalent to Q22 > Q12, and the right hand side is positive. The inequality holds. One can
also redo the same reasoning in the increasing part of the steady-state capital per worker
by assuming ε2 > ε1 so that Q22 > Q12. Moreover, there exists many cases for which
ε1e2 > ε2e1 is possible, especially when the difference in the return in education is high
enough, ε2 − ε1 > α a positive number. Consequently, the same type of results arises in
the increasing part of the steady-state capital per worker.
4Empirical literature includes case studies of Mexican communities that send illegal
migrants to the United States and estimates of the U.S. illegal immigrant population
Hanson and Spilimbergo (1999). Bean et al. (1990), using monthly INS data for
1977-1989, find that border apprehensions declined substantially following the
Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986. Borjas et al. (1991), using annual INS data
for 1967-1984, find that apprehensions by the U.S. Border Patrol are positively
correlated with U.S. expenditure on border enforcement and U.S. real wages.
5In October 2014, a valid job offer in the region of Montréal gives 6 points, and a
validated job offer outside the region of Montréal gives 10 points.
Appendix A
Proof. Proof of Lemma 1. Using Definition 1 forward, Kit+1 = sit , rewrite the second
period budget constraint forward as follows
dit+1 = Rit+1Kit+1 + pit+1θ it+1.
Using the first order condition of the firm (6) and (8)
dit+1 = (1 − σ)Qit+1, (31)
which we put into (4) the first order condition of the individual to have
1
cit






β(1 − σ − ν)K
i
t+1. (32)
Put (32) into (6)
γ
1 − it





By using (8) and (9), we have
σQit
Kit+1
= β(1 − σ − ν) + 1 − σ
β(1 − σ − ν)(1 − εi) , (34)
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which we replace into (33) to have it+1 = it = i, where
i = 1 − σ + β(1 − σ − ν)
(1 + γ (1 − εi))(1 − σ) + β(1 − σ − ν) . (35)
Note that using (4), we can rewrite (7) as
βγ cit






and using (36) and (32), we have θ it+1 = θ it = θ i, where
θ i = ν
γ (1 − σ) + ν . (37)
Appendix B
In order to prove Lemma 3, one can derivate carefully the expressions mi in order to
show that m2 is an increasing convex function of ε2, and m1 is a decreasing concave
function of ε1.
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As long as we have A > 0, the migration flow is an increasing convex function of
ε2, which is equivalent to the following condition and holds for reasonable values of
parameters.
ElasticityLw/ε2 + Elasticityw/ε2 ≥ LElasticityL/ε2
We have shown thatm2 is an increasing and convex migration function. Consequently,
for country 2, the lower the return to education ε2 the higher the migration flows. In the
same way,m1 is a decreasing concave function of the return to education.
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